ON COOPERATIVE GAME APPROACH TO PROFIT SHARING IN A FEW PROJECTS MANAGEMENT PROBLEM

  • N. Boyko Faculty of Information Technologies, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine
  • S. Dotsenko Information systems Support Center, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17721/2706-9699.2019.2.02
Keywords: resources distribution, projects conflict, linear programming problem, cooperative game, characteristic function, core, Shapley value, nucleolus, τ-value

Abstract

The article is consider three different mechanisms of project’s profit sharing, assuming that the projects have common resource pool and both resources and profit may be distributed at arbitrary way without losses. The resources and profit distribution mechanisms are based on cooperative game theory thesis. As three different alternatives, such cooperative game solutions, as Shapley value, nucleolus ant τ-value are proposed. The calculation routine is delivered by easy typical example.

References

Schmeidler D. The nucleolus of a characteristic function game. SIAM Journal of applied mathematics. 1969. Vol. 17. P. 1163-1170.

Mazalov V. Mathematical game theory and applications. Wiley. 2010.

Shapley L. S. A value for n-person games. In: Kuhn H., Tucker A. (eds.) Contributions to the Theory of Games II. Ann. Math. Stud. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 1953. P. 307-317.

Tijs S. Introduction to Game theory. Hindustan Book Agency. 2003.

Published
2019-09-23
Issue
No 2 (131) (2019): Journal of Numerical and Applied Mathematics
Section
Articles